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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                           ---------- 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Three appeals presenting the same critical issue are 
before us.  One appeal originated in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands at docket number 95-7354.  The other two appeals 





District Court of Delaware at docket numbers 96-7529 and 96-
7530.1   
 We scheduled oral argument in all three appeals on the 
same day inasmuch as they raised the same question - should this 
court recognize a parent-child privilege?  The Delaware appeals 
also challenge the adequacy of a Schofield affidavit and charge 
that the in camera ex parte proceeding permitted by the district 
court constituted a deprivation of due process.  We answer the 
questions presented by holding that a parent-child privilege 
should not be recognized, and we affirm the district court's 
rulings which rejected the appellants' objections to the 
Schofield affidavit and in camera ex parte proceeding.  
 
 I. 
 The facts and procedure of the Virgin Islands case 
giving rise to one appeal, and of the Delaware case giving rise 
to two appeals, will be stated separately.2   
                     
1.  Throughout this opinion, where separate identification of the 
appeals is appropriate, we will refer to the appeal which came 
from the District Court of the Virgin Islands as the "Virgin 
Islands appeal" and the appeals from the District of Delaware as 
the "Delaware appeals". 
2.  Due to the nature of the proceedings, the district courts in 
both matters impounded the entire record in each case to protect 
the privacy interests of the parties.  Consequently, we do not 
identify by name either the father or the son who is the target 
of the grand jury investigation in the Virgin Islands case; nor 
the daughter or the father who is the target of the grand jury 





 Docket Number 95-7354: In the Virgin Islands case, the 
grand jury sitting in St. Croix subpoenaed the father of the 
target of the grand jury investigation as a witness.3  The target 
of the grand jury proceeding was the son of the subpoenaed 
witness.  The son became the target of a government investigation 
as a result of "certain transactions that [he] was allegedly 
involved in."  Tr. at 11.  At the time of the alleged 
transactions, the son was eighteen years old. 
 The grand jury subpoenaed the target's father to 
testify on April 18, 1995.  The father, a former FBI agent, lived 
with his wife and son in St. Croix.  On April 17, 1995, based on 
his belief that the grand jury intended to question him about 
conversations that he had had with his son, the father moved to 
quash the subpoena, asserting that those conversations were 
privileged from disclosure under Fed. R. Evid. 501. 
 The father testified, at a hearing before the district 
court, that he and his son "ha[d] an excellent relationship, very 
close, very loving relationship."  Tr. at 4.  He further 
testified that if he were coerced into testifying against his 
son, "[their] relationship would dramatically change and the 
closeness that [they] have would end . . . ."  Id. at 5.  The 
                     
3.  The term of the grand jury in the Virgin Islands case was to 
have ended on September 17, 1996.  However, by Order of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands entered on September 3, 





father further explained that the subpoena would impact 
negatively upon his relationship with his son: 
I will be living under a cloud in which if my son comes to me or 
talks to me, I've got to be very careful what he says, 
what I allow him to say.  I would have to stop him and 
say, "you can't talk to me about that.  You've got to 
talk to your attorney."  It's no way for anybody to 
live in this country. 
 
Id. at 6.  
 On June 19, 1995, the district court entered its order 
denying the father's motion to quash.  On the same day, the 
district court granted the targeted son's motion to intervene and 
then stayed its order which denied the quashing of the father's 
subpoena pending any appeal.  The court's memorandum opinion and 
order, although clearly sympathetic with the plight of the 
subpoenaed father, "regretfully decline[d] to recognize [a 
parent-child] privilege" because the Third Circuit had yet to 
address the issue and "every United States Court of Appeals that 
has confronted this question has declined to recognize the 
parent-child privilege."  In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Misc. No. 
95-0009, at 14 (D.V.I. June 19, 1995).  Appeal of the June 19, 
1995 order was promptly taken by the targeted son on June 22, 
1995.4 
                     
4.  The original appeal in the Virgin Islands case was heard in 
St. Thomas by a panel of this court of which Judge Sarokin was a 
member.  Prior to the filing of an opinion, Judge Sarokin retired 
from office and Judge Greenberg replaced him on the panel.  Panel 





 Docket Numbers 96-7529 & 96-7530:  In the Delaware 
case, a sixteen year old minor daughter was subpoenaed to testify 
before the grand jury, as part of an investigation into her 
father's participation in an alleged interstate kidnapping of a 
woman who had disappeared.   The daughter was scheduled to 
testify on September 10, 1996.  However, on September 9, 1996, a 
motion to quash subpoena was made by counsel for the daughter and 
her mother, as well as by separate counsel for the father.5  
 The motion sought to bar the testimony of the daughter 
claiming a parent-child privilege which would cover testimony and 
confidential communications.  "[T]he privilege [was] claimed for 
confidential communications as well as for protection against 
being compelled to testify in a criminal proceeding".  Joint 
Motion to Quash Subpoena at ¶ 5. 
 The district court held a hearing during the morning of 
September 10, 1996; ordered further briefing due that afternoon6; 
and issued a ruling in the late afternoon denying the motion to 
                     
5.  It appears that although the mother and father of the minor 
witness have taken similar positions in this litigation, albeit 
by different counsel, at the time of these proceedings, they were 
separated. 
6.  The additional briefing was on the issue of whether the 
daughter's testimony would be material and non-duplicative.  
During the hearing, the district court placed the burden on the 
government to make a substantial showing that this threshold was 
met.  The government filed a Schofield affidavit, see infra, and 
volunteered to furnish further particulars at an in camera ex 
parte hearing.  The parents and daughter opposed the in camera ex 
parte proceeding, arguing that if they were foreclosed from 
listening to the government's proffer, there would be no basis 





quash and ordering the minor daughter to testify before the grand 
jury that evening.   
 In the order, the district court reasoned that, because 
there is "no recognized familial privilege", the appropriate 
process for determining whether to grant the motion to quash was 
"to weigh the competing interests of the parties in order to 
determine whether the anticipated testimony of the minor child is 
material and nonduplicative, thus tipping the scales toward 
requiring the testimony".  In re Grand Jury, 96-cv-51, at 1 (D. 
Del. September 10, 1996).  The district court concluded that, 
based on the government's in camera ex parte proffer, "the 
government's interests in compelling the testimony outweigh the 
privacy interests asserted by the moving parties" and denied the 
motion to quash on those grounds.  See id. at 2. 
 Pursuant to the court order, the daughter appeared at 
court (in an ante-room to the grand jury courtroom) in the 
evening of September 10, 1995.  She refused to testify and was 
found in contempt.  The district court then stayed the imposition 
of sanctions during the pendency of these appeals.  Appeal of the 
September 10, 1996 order was promptly made in joint motions by 
mother and daughter, and father on September 13, 1996.7    
                     
7.  The appeals in the Delaware case were expedited by this court 
so that the common issue of parent-child privilege could be heard 






 The district courts had jurisdiction over both the 
Virgin Islands case and Delaware case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction over the appeals taken by the 
intervenors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   See Perlman v. United 
States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1918); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 1024 (3d Cir. 1980).  
In addition, in the Delaware case, the daughter appealed on her 
own behalf after being cited for contempt, providing separate 
grounds for jurisdiction.  See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 
U.S. 323 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906); 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 619 F.2d at 1024. 
 Our review as to all issues, is plenary. 
 
 II. 
 Because we find little merit in the arguments advanced 
in the Delaware case pertaining to the Schofield affidavit and 
the in camera proceeding before the district court, we will 
dispose of these two issues first and without substantial 
discussion.  We then will turn to the more pressing issue of 
whether we should be the first federal Court of Appeals to 
recognize a parent-child privilege. 
 We have held that, when a subpoena for purposes of a 
grand jury proceeding is challenged, the government is "required 
to make some preliminary showing by affidavit that each item is 





grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not 
sought primarily for another purpose."  In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) (Schofield I); see 
also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir.) 
(Schofield II) (identifying this burden of proof as a "three-
pronged showing requirement"), cert. denied sub nom. Schofield v. 
United States, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).  This requirement stems from 
the Schofield cases (I and II) where the targeted defendant had 
refused to furnish handwriting exemplars and had refused to allow 
her fingerprints and photograph to be taken.  We have commonly 
referred to such an affidavit as a Schofield affidavit.8 
 Appellants in the Delaware case argue that the 
government's Schofield affidavit9 was insufficient since it was 
"simply a mere recitation of the requirements, rather than a 
substantive document and was not sufficient to enable the 
District Court to properly balance the interests of the parties." 
 Brief of Appellant Doe #1 at 21.  They argue further that "The 
Government's affidavit does not meet. . . [the Schofield II] 
test. . . It is written in conclusory terms and makes no effort 
                     
8.  In Schofield II, we held that the affidavit complying with 
this three-pronged requirement sufficed to meet the government's 
burden and hence we upheld the government's subpoena.  See 
Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 963. 
9.  The affidavit stated that the daughter's testimony would be 
"essential and necessary" and "relevant" to the grand jury 
investigation; that the testimony was "properly within the Grand 
Jury's jurisdiction" and was "not sought primarily for any other 
purpose".  Government's Response to Joint Motion to Quash 





to state any facts at all. .  . More should be required where the 
Government seeks to place a child in a Grand Jury proceeding..." 
Brief of Appellant Doe #2 at 25. 
 Our review of the affidavit presented by the government 
in the present matter satisfies us that it contained the 
requisite elements as mandated in Schofield II.  It "provide[s] a 
minimum disclosure of the grand jury's purpose" by demonstrating 
that the daughter's testimony would be "at least relevant to an 
investigation being conducted by the grand jury and properly 
within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for another 
purpose".   Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 965 (citing Schofield I, 
486 F.2d at 93).   These elements satisfy the minimal disclosure 
requirements of Schofield II. 
 The district court could, of course, in its discretion, 
require additional information.  See Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 
965.  Here the district court exercised its discretion by not 
requiring anything additional in the affidavit, but decided 
instead to hold a hearing on the government's proffer and to do 
so in camera and ex parte. 
 We hold that the government met its burden of proof 
with regard to the adequacy of the Schofield affidavit, and since 
the appellants have not demonstrated that the affidavit was 
insufficient or that there was an abuse of the grand jury 
process, we are persuaded that the district court did not err in 





F.2d at 92 ("the party objecting to the enforcement has the 
burden of making some showing of irregularity"); Schofield II, 
507 F.2d at 965 ("the burden is generally on the witness to show 
abuse of the grand jury process"). 
 Appellants next argue that the district court erred in 
conducting the in camera hearing ex parte.  They contend that 
they were prejudiced by their inability to respond to the 
government's proffer and that therefore their due process rights 
were violated.10  We cannot agree. 
 District courts have considerable discretion in 
determining whether additional proceedings - beyond the Schofield 
affidavit - are warranted, including in camera hearings.  See 
Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93; see generally United States v. 
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1988).   
 The purpose of the in camera hearing was to aid the 
district court in balancing the government's need for the 
daughter's testimony against the privacy concerns of the daughter 
and her family.  The district court placed a threshold burden on 
the government to demonstrate the materiality and non-duplicative 
nature of the daughter's testimony, in order that it could 
determine whether the testimony was necessary for the grand jury 
proceedings, or whether instead, it should grant appellants' 
motion to quash.   
                     
10.  Appellants cite 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(2) (Supp. 1996) as 
support for their argument; however, we note that this provision, 





 The government's proffer was presented in camera and 
heard ex parte in order to protect the confidentiality of the 
grand jury proceeding.  Ex parte in camera hearings have been 
held proper in order to preserve the ongoing interest in grand 
jury secrecy.  See generally In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 
670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); In re Grand 
Jury Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1982).  The 
secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the present matter might 
have been compromised by divulging the specific questions that 
the government intended to ask during the daughter's testimony.  
Judicial supervision and interference with grand jury proceedings 
should always be kept to a minimum.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992).   
 After reviewing the government's in camera proffer, the 
district court judge denied the motion to quash, having 
determined that the daughter's testimony would be material and 
non-duplicative, and that "the government's interests in 
compelling the testimony outweigh the privacy interests asserted 
by the moving party".  In re Grand Jury, 96-cv-51, at ¶ 3 (D. 
Del. September 10, 1996).  We hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in hearing the government's proffer in 
camera and ex parte.11 
                     
11.  In her dissenting and concurring opinion, Judge Mansmann 
registers disturbance because of the Schofield procedure employed 
by the district court.  See Dissenting Opinion at 20-21. 
 We are bound by Schofield.  See I.O.P. § 9.1.  The 
district court judge adhered to our Schofield instruction and 







 The central question in these appeals is one of first 
impression in this court: should we recognize a parent-child 
testimonial privilege?  Appellants argue that recognition is 
necessary in order to advance important public policy interests 
such as the protection of strong and trusting parent-child 
relationships; the preservation of the family; safeguarding of 
privacy interests and protection from harmful government 
intrusion; and the promotion of healthy psychological development 
of children.  See Brief of Appellant in Virgin Islands case at 8-
9; Brief of Appellant Doe #1 at 9-14; Brief of Appellant Doe #2 
at 10-20.  These public policy arguments echo those advanced by 
academicians and other legal commentators in the myriad of law 
review articles discussing the parent-child testimonial 
privilege.12   
(..continued) 
parte hearing which we have found to be within the Schofield 
doctrine.  Judge Mansmann's criticism of that procedure is one 
that can only be remedied by an en banc court. 
12.   See, e.g., Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, To Tell or 
Not to Tell?  An Analysis of Testimonial Privileges:  The Parent-
Child and Reporter Privileges, 9 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 163 
(1993); Daniel R. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications:  Spare the 
Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 Dick. L. Rev. 599 (1970); David 
A. Schlueter, The Parent-Child Privilege:  A Response to Calls 
for Adoption, 19 St. Mary's L.J. 35 (1987); Ann M. Stanton, 
Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications:  An 
Examination and Proposal, 16 Fam. L.Q. 1 (1982); Larry M. Bauer, 
Note, Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 23 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 676 (1979); Jeffrey Begens, Comment, Parent-Child 
Testimonial Privilege:  An Absolute Right or an Absolute 
Privilege?, 11 U. Dayton L. Rev. 709 (1986); Betsy Booth, 





 Although legal academicians appear to favor adoption of 
a parent-child testimonial privilege, no federal Court of Appeals 
and no state supreme court has recognized such a privilege.  We 
too decline to recognize such a privilege for the following 
reasons: 
 (1)The overwhelming majority of all courts--federal or 
state--have rejected such a privilege. 
 
  (a)Eight federal Courts of Appeals have rejected such a 
privilege and none of the remaining Courts of 
Appeals have recognized such a privilege. 
 
 (b)Every state supreme court that has addressed the issue 
has rejected the privilege, and only four states 
have protected parent-child communications in some 
manner.13 
(..continued) 
Parent-Child Privilege, 36 Sw. L.J. 1175 (1983); J. Tyson Covey, 
Note, Making Form Follow Function:  Considerations in Creating 
and Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 879; Gregory W. Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of 
the Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege:  Too Big For Its 
Britches?, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 145 (1984); Patrick Koepp, 
Comment, A Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege:  Its Present 
Existence, Whether It Should Exist, and To What Extent, 13 Cap. 
U. L. Rev. 555 (1984); Bruce N. Lemons, Comment, From the Mouths 
of Babes:  Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy Mandate a 
Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1002 (1978); 
Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege:  A Proposal, 47 Fordham L. 
Rev. 771 (1979); Comment, Confidential Communication Between 
Parent and Child:  A Constitutional Right, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 
811 (1979); Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child 
Testimonial Privilege, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 142 (1980); Note, 
Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 
910 (1987); Note, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege:  Preserving 
and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 901 (1983). 
13.  New York is the only state which has a judicially-recognized 
parent-child privilege; however, the privilege has only been 
recognized by inferior New York courts. 
 Idaho and Minnesota are the only states which have 
recognized a variant of the parent-child privilege through 
statute.   See Idaho Code § 9-203(7) (1990 & Supp. 1995); Minn. 
Stat. § 595.02(1)(j) (1988 & Supp. 1996).   It is important to 






  (c)No state within the Third Circuit has recognized a 
parent-child privilege. 
 
(2)No reasoned analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 or of the 
standards established by the Supreme Court or by this 
court supports the creation of a privilege. 
 
(3)Creation of such a privilege would have no impact on the 
parental relationship and hence would neither benefit 
that relationship nor serve any social policy. 
 
(4)Although we have the authority to recognize a new privilege, 
we believe the recognition of such a privilege, if one 




A.FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS HAVE DECLINED TO RECOGNIZE A PARENT-
CHILD PRIVILEGE. 
 
 1.Eight Federal Courts of Appeals Have Explicitly Rejected 
the Privilege and None of the Remaining Courts of 
Appeals Have Recognized the Privilege. 
 
  The appellants rely primarily upon law review articles 
rather than case law authority to support the position that a 
parent-child testimonial privilege should be recognized.  No case 
law recognizing such a privilege exists.  On the other hand, the 
eight federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue 
have uniformly declined to recognize a parent-child privilege.  
(..continued) 
 Massachusetts law prevents a minor child from 
testifying against a parent in a criminal proceeding.  However, 
the statute does not go so far as to recognize a parent-child 
testimonial privilege.  First, the Massachusetts statute does not 
create a testimonial privilege; rather it is best described as a 
witness-disqualification rule.   Second, the testimonial bar is 
not of common-law origin but is statutory.  Finally, the statute 
only bars a minor child, under certain circumstances, from 
testifying against a parent, and does not extend to children of 
all ages in all circumstances.  See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 233, § 20 





See In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (John Doe), 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 894 (1988); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kaprelian v. United States, 474 U.S. 
1008 (1985); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena (Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), 
reh'g denied, 749 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Starr), 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (per curiam); 
United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).  Moreover, the remaining federal 
Courts of Appeals that have not explicitly rejected the privilege 
have not chosen to recognize the privilege either. 
  Additional federal case law rejecting the privilege can 
be found in district court cases and in related contexts where 
the privilege was disapproved.  See United States v. Duran, 884 
F. Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C. 1995) ("The general rule in most 
federal courts is that there is no parent-child privilege."); In 
re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("[T]here is no 
such thing [as a parent-child privilege].").  Cf. In Re Grand 
Jury Subpoena (Matthews), 714 F.2d 223, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that grand jury witness was not entitled to assert a 
"family privilege" to avoid answering questions that might 





347, 349 n.4 (4th Cir.) (refusing to recognize privilege not to 
testify against brother and cousin), cert. dismissed sub nom. Doe 
v. United States, 464 U.S. 978 (1983); United States ex rel. 
Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir.) (declining to 
recognize parent-child privilege under Illinois law), cert. 





 2.State Courts Have Overwhelmingly Rejected the Privilege. 
 
  The overwhelming majority of state courts, like their 
federal counterparts, have also declined to recognize a common-
law parent-child privilege.  See, e.g., In re Inquest 
Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790 (Vt. 1996)14; In re Terry W., 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 
384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 
1241 (Ill. 1983);  Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1981); Cissna v. State, 352 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);  
State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981); State v. Willoughby, 
532 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Me. 1987); State v. Delong, 456 A.2d 877 
(Me. 1983); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 
(Mass. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 
U.S. 1068 (1984); State v. Amos, 414 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1987) (per curiam); Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); State v. Bruce, 655 
S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. 
of Lane County v. Gibson, 718 P.2d 759 (Ore. Ct. App. 1986); In 
re Gail D., 525 A.2d 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); In re 
Frances J., 456 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1983); De Leon v. State, 684 
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297 
(Wash. 1988). Cf. Stewart v. Superior Court, 787 P.2d 126 (Ariz. 
1989).15 
                     
14.  The appellants in In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790 
(Vt. 1996) cited the cases of In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Agosto), 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) and People v. 





 3.Only Two Federal District Court Cases Recognize the 
Privilege, and These Cases are Distinguishable and Not 
Authoritative. 
 
  The parent-child privilege has not been recognized by 
any federal or state court with the exception of two federal 
(..continued) 
support of their argument that a parent-child privilege should be 
recognized.  The Vermont Supreme Court declined to follow either 
case: it declined to follow Agosto for much the same reasons as 
we discuss infra in text, and it declined to follow Fitzgerald 
which was limited by People v. Harrell, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1982), aff'd, 463 N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y. 1983).  See infra 
note 15. 
15.  New York's inferior courts are the only state courts which 
have judicially recognized a parent-child privilege.  See In re 
Mark G., 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); In re A & M, 403 
N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931 
(N.Y.  Fam. Ct. 1984); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 
(Westchester County Ct. 1979).  The privilege so-recognized is 
essentially derived from New York's constitution.  The New York 
Appellate Division explained that the privilege it recognized was 
rooted in the constitutional right to privacy: 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of a statutory privilege, we 
may, nevertheless, draw from the principles of 
privileged communications in determining in what manner 
the protection of the Constitution should be extended 
to the child-parent communication. . . .  We conclude . 
. . that communications made by a minor child to his 
parents within the context of the family relationship 
may, under some circumstances, lie within the 'private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'"   
 
In re A & M, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (emphasis added); see also 
People v. Harrell, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. App. Civ. 1982) 
(privilege is not rooted in common law, statute, or the 6th 
amendment).  
 New York courts apply the parent-child privilege 
sparingly.  For example, New York's Court of Appeals declined to 
apply the parent-child privilege to a murder confession made by a 
28 year old defendant to his mother, due to defendant's age; lack 
of confidentiality; subject of conversation; and the fact that 
the mother had already testified in front of grand jury 






district court cases which are readily distinguishable: In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) 
and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982). 
  In Agosto, the thirty-two-year-old son of an alleged 
tax evader moved to quash a subpoena ad testificandum requiring 
him to testify against his father.  See Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 
1299. Although the district court recognized a common-law 
privilege, it did so in derogation of the prevailing 
jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit, which, in an en banc 
decision, had expressly rejected a parent-child privilege.  See 
United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).  Agosto therefore conflicts squarely 
with its own circuit's en banc precedent.  It is not surprising 
that in her dissent, Judge Mansmann, although apparently 
approving of the reasoning in Agosto and citing to it on pages 11 
and 18 n.17, is no more persuaded by Agosto than we are. 
  In Greenberg, a mother sought relief from a civil 
contempt charge when she refused to testify before a federal 
grand jury in order to protect her adult daughter, who had been 
indicted by a Florida grand jury for importation of marijuana.  
See Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. at 580.  The district court 
recognized a limited testimonial privilege grounded in the First 
Amendment free exercise clause; however, the court declined to 





  Observing that the daughter, as an adult, did not 
require the same degree of guidance and support as a young child, 
the court reasoned that although compelled disclosure of 
nonincriminating confidences might damage the relationship 
between the mother and her daughter, the harm would be less 
severe than if an unemancipated minor were involved.  See id. at 
586-87.  Concluding that this lesser degree of harm did not 
outweigh the state's need for the testimony, the district court 
held that the facts did not justify the creation of a common-law 
parent-child privilege.  See id. at 587.  Greenberg therefore 
does not support the creation of a general testimonial parent-
child privilege; furthermore, its limited holding does not extend 
to the present matter since religious principles are not 
implicated here. 
 
B.THE STANDARDS PRESCRIBED BY FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501 DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A PRIVILEGE. 
 
  Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that "the privi-
lege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of 
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the 
United States in the light of reason and experience."  No such 
principle, interpretation, reason or experience has been drawn 
upon here. 
  It is true that Congress, in enacting Fed. R. Evid. 
501, "manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law 





the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case 
basis,' and to leave the door open to change."  Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (quoting 102 Cong. Rec. 40,891 
(1974) (statement of Rep. William Hungate)).  In doing so, 
however, we are admonished that privileges are generally 
disfavored;16 that "'the public . . . has a right to every man's 
evidence'";17 and that privileges are tolerable "only to the very 
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding 
relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth."18 
  In keeping with these principles, the Supreme Court has 
rarely expanded common-law testimonial privileges.19  Following 
                     
16.  See, e.g., In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. 1981) 
("The basis of justice is truth and our system frowns upon 
impediments to ascertaining that truth."), cert. denied sub nom. 
Dinnan v. Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). 
17.  Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 
U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
18.  Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation omitted).   
19.  See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (narrowing husband-wife 
privilege and holding that witness spouse may testify over the 
objections of the other spouse); University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 
U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (declining to recognize a privilege for 
academic peer review proceedings); United States v. Arthur Young 
& Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-19 (1984) (rejecting an accountant work-
product privilege); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367-
68 (1980) (expressly refusing to recognize a privilege for state 
legislators in federal court); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 709 (1974) (rejecting a privilege for confidential 
communications between the President and the President's high-
level advisors); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) 





the Supreme Court's teachings, other federal courts, including 
this court, have likewise declined to exercise their power under 
Rule 501 expansively.  See, e.g., United States v. Schoenheinz, 
548 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1977) (declining to recognize an 
employer-stenographer privilege); In re Grand Jury Impaneled on 
January 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976) (declining to 
recognize a required-reports privilege). 
  Neither the appellants nor the dissent has identified 
any principle of common law, and hence have proved no 
interpretation of such a principle.  Nor has the dissent or the 
appellants discussed any common-law principle in light of reason 
and experience.  Accordingly, no basis has been demonstrated for 
this court to adopt a parent-child privilege. 
 
C.CREATING A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE TEACHINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF THIS COURT. 
 
 1.Supreme Court 
 
  The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in the 
law of privileges, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), 
which recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege, supports 
the conclusion that a privilege should not, and cannot, be 
created here.  In Jaffee, the Supreme Court reemphasized that the 
predominant common-law principle which guides a federal court's 
determination of whether a privilege applies is the maxim that 
testimonial privileges are disfavored: 
 The common-law principles underlying the recognition of 





more than three centuries it has now been recognized as 
a fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right 
to every man's evidence.  When we come to examine the 
various claims of exemption, we start with the primary 
assumption that there is a general duty to give what 
testimony one is capable of giving, and that any 
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, 
being so many derogations from a positive general 
rule.'" 
 
Id. at 1928 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 
(1950) (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 
1940))).  An exception to this general rule is justified only 
when recognition of a privilege would promote a "'public good 
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all 
rational means for ascertaining the truth.'"  Id. (quoting 
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))). 
  The Jaffee Court emphasized that a court, in determin-
ing whether a particular privilege "'promotes sufficiently 
important interests to outweigh the need for probative ev-
idence,'" Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51), must be guided 
by "reason and experience."  Specifically, the Jaffee Court in-
structed that a federal court should look to the "experience" of 
state courts:  "[T]he policy decision of the States bear on the 
question [of] whether federal courts should recognize a new 
privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one."  Id. at 
1929-30. 
  Notably, in recognizing a psychotherapist-patient 





states had enacted some form of a psychotherapist privilege.  Id. 
at 1929 & n.11 (listing state statutes).  The Jaffee Court ex-
plained that "it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of 
policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both 
'reason' and 'experience.'"  Id. at 1930. 
  Here, by contrast, only four states have deemed it 
necessary to protect from disclosure, in any manner, confidential 
communications between children and their parents.  As previously 
noted, New York state courts have recognized a limited parent-
child privilege, and Idaho and Minnesota have enacted limited 
statutory privileges protecting confidential communications by 
minors to their parents.  See supra notes 13 & 15.  In 
Massachusetts, as we have noted, minor children are statutorily 
disqualified from testifying against their parents in criminal 
proceedings.  See id.   No state within the Third Circuit has 
adopted a parent-child privilege. 
  The policy determinations of these four states do not 
constitute a "consistent body of policy determinations by 
state[s]" supporting recognition of a parent-child privilege.  
Indeed, if anything, the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
states have chosen not to create a parent-child privilege sup-
ports the opposite conclusion:  "reason and experience" dictate 
that federal courts should refuse to recognize a privilege 





  The Jaffee Court also relied on the fact that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege was among the nine specific 
privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Evidence in 1972.  See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928-30 & n.7; see 
also Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1973).  Additionally, the 
Jaffee Court noted:  "[O]ur holding [United States v. Gillock, 
445 U.S. 360 (1980)] that Rule 501 did not include a state 
legislative privilege relied, in part, on the fact that no such 
privilege was included in the Advisory Committee's draft [of the 
proposed privilege rules]."  Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930. 
  In the instant cases, in contrast to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee, the parent-child 
privilege, like the state legislative privilege rejected in 
Gillock, was not among the enumerated privileges submitted by the 
Advisory Committee.  Although this fact, in and of itself, is not 
dispositive with respect to the question as to whether this court 
should create a privilege, it strongly suggests that the Advisory 
Committee, like the majority of state legislatures, did not 
regard confidential parent-child communications sufficiently 
important to warrant "privilege" protection. 
  A federal court should give due consideration, and 
accord proper weight, to the judgment of the Advisory Committee 





it is appropriate to create a new privilege pursuant to Rule 501. 
  
 2. Third Circuit 
  Under the analytic framework set forth in this court's 
precedents, creating a parent-child privilege would be ill-
advised.  In In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (Becker, J.), we adopted a clergy-communicant 
privilege.  We did so, however, only after examining the state 
and federal precedents addressing the issue of a clergy-
communicant privilege and after determining that these 
precedents, on balance, weighed in favor of recognizing such a 
privilege.  Id. at 379-84.  Indeed, we instructed that an 
examination of such precedents was mandatory: 
Both the history and the language of Rule 501, therefore, 
provide us with a mandate to develop evidentiary 
privileges in accordance with common law principles.  
This mandate, in turn, requires us to examine federal 
and state case law and impels us to consult treatises 
and commentaries on the law of evidence that elucidate 
the development of the common law. 
 
Id. at 379. 
  Moreover, like the Jaffee Court and perhaps in antici-
pation of Jaffee's instructions, Judge Becker considered the 
"reason and experience" of the state legislatures and of the 
Advisory Committee.  First, Judge Becker, writing for a unanimous 
panel, noted that "virtually every state has recognized some form 
of a clergy-communicant privilege."  Id. at 381 & n.10 (listing 





  In addition, Judge Becker posited that "the proposed 
rules prove a useful reference point and offer guidance in 
defining the existence and scope of evidentiary privileges in the 
federal courts."  Id. at 380.  Judge Becker further explained: 
"[I]n many instances, the proposed rules, [used as] 
[s]tandards, remain a convenient and useful starting 
point for examining questions of privilege.  The 
[s]tandards are the culmination of three drafts 
prepared by an Advisory Committee consisting of judges, 
practicing lawyers and academicians. . . .  Finally, 
they were adopted by the Supreme Court. . . .  
 . . . .  
 . . . [T]he Advisory Committee in drafting the 
Standards was for the most part restating the law 
currently applied in the federal courts. 
 
Id. at 380-81 (quoting J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence ¶ 501[03] (1987)).  Judge Becker then concluded that 
"[t]he inclusion of the clergy-communicant privilege in the 
proposed rules, taken together with its uncontroversial nature, 
strongly suggests that [that] privilege is, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, 'indelibly ensconced' in the American common law." 
 Id. at 381 (quoting Gillock, 445 U.S. at 368).  Judge Becker 
also provided a detailed exegesis of the historical development 
of the clergy-communicant privilege, stressing that common-law 
tradition, as reflected in practice and case law, supported 
recognition of such a privilege.   
  In contrast, the parent-child privilege sought to be 
recognized here is of relatively recent vintage, see Ismail, 756 
F.2d at 1257-58 ("The parent-child privilege did not exist at 





academicians.  See supra note 12.  Unlike, for example, the 
attorney-client privilege, which is "the oldest" common-law 
privilege, see United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989); 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), the 
parent-child privilege lacks historical antecedents. 
  Furthermore, an analysis of the four Wigmore factors, 
which Judge Becker used to buttress this court's disposition in 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, does not support the creation of 
a privilege.  Dean Wigmore's four-factor formula requires 
satisfaction of all four factors in order to establish a 
privilege: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that 
they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation 
between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered.  
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communications must be greater than 
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation. 
 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384 (quoting 8 John 
H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) 
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
  At least two of Wigmore's prerequisite conditions for 
creation of a federal common-law privilege are not met under the 
facts of these cases.  We refer to the second and fourth elements 
of the Wigmore test.20 
                     
20.  The most recent case addressing a parent-child privilege 





  First, confidentiality--in the form of a testimonial 
privilege--is not essential to a successful parent-child 
relationship, as required by the second factor.  A privilege 
should be recognized only where such a privilege would be 
indispensable to the survival of the relationship that society 
deems should be fostered.  For instance, because complete candor 
and full disclosure by the client is absolutely necessary in 
order for the attorney to function effectively, society recogniz-
es an attorney-client privilege.  Without a guarantee of secrecy, 
clients would be unwilling to reveal damaging information.  As a 
corollary, clients would disclose negative information, which an 
attorney must know to prove effective representation, only if 
they were assured that such disclosures are privileged. 
  In contrast, it is not clear whether children would be 
more likely to discuss private matters with their parents if a 
parent-child privilege were recognized than if one were not.  It 
is not likely that children, or even their parents, would 
typically be aware of the existence or non-existence of a 
testimonial privilege covering parent-child communications.  On 
the other hand, professionals such as attorneys, doctors and 
members of the clergy would know of the privilege that attends 
their respective profession, and their clients, patients or 
(..continued) 
declined to adopt the privilege after determining that the 
privilege failed to satisfy two of the four factors - the same 
factors which are not satisfied here.  See In re Inquest 





parishioners would also be aware that their confidential conver-
sations are protected from compelled disclosure.21 
  Moreover, even assuming arguendo that children and 
their parents generally are aware of whether or not their commu-
nications are protected from disclosure, it is not certain that 
the existence of a privilege enters into whatever thought 
processes are performed by children in deciding whether or not to 
confide in their parents.  Indeed, the existence or nonexistence 
of a parent-child privilege is probably one of the least 
important considerations in any child's decision as to whether to 
reveal some indiscretion, legal or illegal, to a parent.  
Moreover, it is unlikely that any parent would choose to deter a 
child from revealing a confidence to the parent solely because a 
federal court has refused to recognize a privilege protecting 
such communications from disclosure.  
                     
21.  Notably, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence 
reached a similar conclusion with respect to a marital 
communications privilege.  The Advisory Committee explained: 
 
 [Proposed Rule 505] recognizes no privilege for 
confidential communications [between spouses]. . . .  
[It cannot] be assumed that marital conduct will be 
affected by a privilege for confidential communications 
of whose existence the parties in all likelihood are 
unaware.  The other communication privileges, by way of 
contrast, have as one party a professional person who 
can be expected to inform the other of the existence of 
the privilege.   
 






  Finally, the proposed parent-child privilege fails to 
satisfy the fourth condition of the Wigmore test.  As explained 
above, any injury to the parent-child relationship resulting from 
non-recognition of such a privilege would be relatively 
insignificant.  In contrast, the cost of recognizing such a 
privilege is substantial:  the impairment of the truth-seeking 
function of the judicial system and the increased likelihood of 
injustice resulting from the concealment of relevant information. 
 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (stating 
that "[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary 
system is both fundamental and comprehensive"). 
  Moreover, because no clear benefit flows from the 
recognition of a parent-child privilege, any injury to the 
parent-child relationship caused by compelled testimony as to 
confidential communications is necessarily and substantially out-
weighed by the benefit to society of obtaining all relevant 
evidence in a criminal case.  See, e.g., In re Inquest 
Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790, 793 (Vt. 1996) (finding that although 
harm may result from disclosure of a child's confidence, such 
harm does not outweigh "the public interest in seeking the truth 
within the context of a criminal investigation"); State v. Maxon, 
756 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Wash. 1988) (stating that the loss of 
relevant evidence outweighs the public policy favoring a 
parent-child privilege).  In short, the public good derived from 





transcends the value of effective and efficient judicial truth-
finding. 
  An even more compelling reason for rejecting a parent-
child privilege stems from the fact that the parent-child 
relationship differs dramatically from other relationships.  This 
is due to the unique duty owing to the child from the parent.  A 
parent owes the duty to the child to nurture and guide the child. 
 This duty is unusual because it inheres in the relationship and 
the relationship arises automatically at the child's birth.   
  If, for example, a fifteen year old unemancipated child 
informs her parent that she has committed a crime or has been 
using or distributing narcotics, and this disclosure has been 
made in confidence while the child is seeking guidance, it is 
evident to us that, regardless of whether the child consents or 
not, the parent must have the right to take such action as the 
parent deems appropriate in the interest of the child.  That 
action could be commitment to a drug rehabilitation center or a 
report of the crime to the juvenile authorities.  This is so 
because, in theory at least, juvenile proceedings are undertaken 
solely in the interest of the child.  We would regard it 
intolerable in such a situation if the law intruded in the guise 
of a privilege, and silenced the parent because the child had a 
privilege to prevent disclosure. 
  This results in the analysis that any privilege, if 





asserting it.  However, in such a case, the privilege would 
disappear if the parent can waive it.  It follows therefore that, 
if a child is able to communicate openly with a parent and seeks 
guidance from that parent, the entire basis for the privilege is 
destroyed if the child is required to recognize that confidence 
will be maintained only so long as the parent wants the 
conversation to be confidential.  If, however, the parent can 
waive the privilege unilaterally, the goal of the privilege is 
destroyed.  When the Supreme Court authorized a psychotherapist-
patient privilege in Jaffee, it told us as much in stating,  
 
 We part company with the Court of Appeals on a 
separate point.  We reject the balancing 
component of the privilege implemented by 
that court and a small number of States.  
Making the promise of confidentiality 
contingent upon a trial judge's later 
evaluation of the relative importance of the 
patient's interest in privacy and evidentiary 
need for disclosure would eviscerate the 
effectiveness of the privilege.  As we 
explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of the 
privilege is to be served, the participants 
in the confidential conversation 'must be 
able to predict with some degree of certainty 
whether particular discussions will be 
protected.  An uncertain privilege, or one 
which purports to be certain but results in 
widely varying applications by the courts, is 
little better than no privilege at all.' 
 
 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (1996) (quoting Upjohn 
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
  It follows then that an effective parent-child 





sealing would be inexcusable in the parent-child relationship.  
No government should have that power.   
  Indeed the obligation on the parent to act goes far 
beyond the parent's obligation to raise and nurture the child.  
Thus a parent-child privilege implicates considerations which are 
vastly different from the traditional privileges to which resort 
is had as analogues. 
  In sum, neither historical tradition, nor common-law 
principles, nor Wigmore formulations, nor the logic of 
privileges, nor the "reason and experience" of the various states 
supports creation of a parent-child privilege.   
 
D. RECOGNITION OF A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE LEFT TO 
 CONGRESS. 
  Although we, and our sister courts, obviously have 
authority to develop and modify the common law of privileges, we 
should be circumspect about creating new privileges based upon 
perceived public policy considerations.  This is particularly so 
where there exist policy concerns which the legislative branch is 
better equipped to evaluate.  To paraphrase Justice Scalia, 
writing in dissent in Jaffee, and referring to the psycho-
therapist privilege: 
The question before us today is not whether there should be an 
evidentiary privilege for [parent-child 
communications].  Perhaps there should.  But the 
question before us is whether (1) the need for that 
privilege is so clear, and (2) the desirable contours 
of that privilege are so evident, that it is 
appropriate for this [c]ourt to craft it in common law 





Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1940 (1996) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting). 
  The legislature, not the judiciary, is institutionally 
better equipped to perform the balancing of the competing policy 
issues required in deciding whether the recognition of a parent- 
child privilege is in the best interests of society.  Congress, 
through its legislative mechanisms, is also better suited for the 
task of defining the scope of any prospective privilege.22  
 Congress, is able to consider, for example, society's moral, 
sociological, economic, religious and other values without being 
confined to the evidentiary record in any particular case.  Thus, 
in determining whether a parent-child privilege should obtain, 
Congress can take into consideration a host of facts and factors 
which the judiciary may be unable to consider.  These 
considerations are also relevant to determining whether the 
privilege, if it is to be recognized, should extend to adult 
children, adopted children or unemancipated minors.23   
                     
22.  In a state context, in In re: A & M, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 381 (App. 
Div. 1978), the New York Appellate Division expressly declined to 
adopt a common-law privilege, explaining: "[A]lthough there are 
persuasive arguments to apply a privilege in these circumstances, 
we believe that the creation of a privilege devolves exclusively 
on the Legislature." Id. (footnotes omitted).   
    We recognize, of course, that the Advisory Committee Notes to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that privileges shall 
continue to be developed by the courts of the United States. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 501 advisory committee's notes. 
23.  Should the privilege be restricted to unemancipated minors 
or should it extend to all children, regardless of age, 
unemancipated and emancipated?  No apposite case, state or 
federal, provides a parent-child privilege for adults or 





  Among additional factors that Congress could consider 
are other parameters of familial relationships.  Does "parent" 
include step-parent or grand-parent?  Does "child" include an 
adopted child, or a step-child?  Should the privilege extend to 
siblings?  Furthermore, if another family member is present at 
the time of the relevant communication, is the privilege 
automatically barred or destroyed?  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena (Matthews), 714 F.2d at 224-25 (in-laws); United States 
v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d at 349 n.4 (brother and cousin).  
(..continued) 
1993); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1987);  In re Gail 
D., 525 A.2d 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); State v. 
Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1988).  Nor do any state statutes 
provide a privilege for emancipated children.  Indeed, both Idaho 
and Minnesota, by statute, limit their variants of the parent-
child privilege to children under age 18.  See Idaho Code §§ 9-
203(7), 32-101 (1990 & Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. §§ 595.02(1)(j), 
645.451 (1988 & Supp. 1996).   
   In the present case, of course, the daughter in the 
Delaware appeals is 16 years old and unemancipated.  Hence, the 
issue of extending the privilege to an adult or an emancipated 
child is not relevant insofar as the Delaware target is 
concerned.  However, the appellant-son in the Virgin Islands 
case, who was 18 years old at the time of the relevant 
communication, and, therefore, no longer a minor nor 
unemancipated, urges that the privilege be unrestricted with 
regard to age.  Under Virgin Islands law, the son would be deemed 
emancipated.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 261 (providing that 
the age of majority in the Virgin Islands is 18 years old); V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 16, § 221(4) (minor becomes "emancipat[ed]" by 
reason of having attained the age of majority"); see also In Re 
Guardianship of Penn, 15 F.3d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting 
that Virgin Islands legislature, in 1972, lowered the age of 
majority from 21 to 18); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 
549 F.2d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 1977)(same).   
   Similarly, federal law would indicate that an 
individual attains adulthood at the age of 18 years.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2255 (1984) (defining "minor" as "any person under the 
age of 18 years"); 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (Supp. 1996) (defining 
"juvenile" as a person who has not attained his eighteenth 





   Hence, as a court without the ability to consider 
matters beyond the evidentiary record presented, we should be 
chary about creating new privileges and ordinarily should defer 
to the legislature to do so.  See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (plurality) (suggesting that courts should 
yield to legislatures in creating and defining privileges);  
People v. Dixon, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating that creation of parent-child testimonial privilege is 
best left to legislature); In re Parkway Manor Healthcare Ctr., 
448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (deferring to 
legislature to create a privilege for self-evaluation data); Cook 
v. King County, 510 P.2d 659, 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) 
("Although 'privilege' is a common-law concept, the granting of a 
testimonial privilege is a recognized function of legislative 
power.").  Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that one basis 
for its disinclination to recognize new privileges is deference 
to the legislature: 
 We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an 
area where it appears that Congress has considered the 
relevant competing concerns but has not provided the 
privilege itself. 
 
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. at 189.   
  Congress too has recognized the importance of privilege 
rules insofar as the truth-seeking process is concerned.  Con-
gress specifically addressed that subject when it delegated rule-
making authority to the Supreme Court as to rules of procedure 





of privileges as a special area meriting greater legislative 
oversight.  Congress expressly provided that "[a]ny . . . rule 
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall 
have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress."  28 
U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1994).  In contrast, all other evidentiary 
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court and transmitted to 
Congress automatically take effect unless Congress enacts a 
statute to the contrary.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994).24 
 
 IV. 
  A few further observations about the dissent and why it 
does not persuade us that the parent-child privilege outweighs 
the government's interest in disclosure: 
  First, in her dissenting and concurring opinion, Judge 
Mansmann attempts to distinguish the Virgin Islands appeal (where 
a father has been subpoenaed to testify about communications made 
to him by his son who is over the age of eighteen25), from the 
                     
24.  The preferred method by which any Rule of Evidence would be 
proposed and ultimately promulgated would be by proceeding:  
first, through the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, then 
to the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Practice and 
Procedure (with public notice and comment at both these stages), 
then to the Judicial Conference of the United States, and then, 
of course, to the Supreme Court, which, if the proposed Rule was 
approved, would then transmit the proposed Rule to Congress for 
its consideration.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072, et seq.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3402, 3771, 3772. 
25.  Because the son is over eighteen years of age, under Judge 
Mansmann's formulation of the privilege, we assume there would 
have to be a hearing by the district court to assess various 
factors to determine whether a privilege would lie (since Judge 





Delaware appeal (where a teenage daughter has been subpoenaed to 
give testimony against her father).  The record of the Delaware 
appeal, however, does not inform us as to the nature of the 
testimony being sought or the nature of the daughter's knowledge. 
 Does it arise from observations, overheard statements, 
communications with her father, or some other source?  If indeed 
it arises from confidential communications, does the privilege 
advocated by Judge Mansmann in the Virgin Islands case then 
apply?  If so, is the alleged distinction a valid one, or do both 
appeals suffer from the same deficiencies we have identified with 
respect to any parent-child privilege?   
  Secondly, we note that the Virgin Islands privilege 
which Judge Mansmann would recognize, while characterized as a 
limited one, would only come into play where a child has made a 
confidential communication to a parent in the course of seeking 
parental advice.  See Dissenting Opinion at 7.26  Both of these 
(..continued) 
age).  These "factors" would include such variables as age, 
maturity, the child's residence and the precise nature of the 
communication.  See Dissenting Opinion at 7. 
 We have already discussed the limitation of such a 
privilege to minors, (see note 23 supra) and know of no case 
where an adult child and his or her parent have been able to 
invoke the privilege. 
26.  We note that, although Judge Mansmann urges that we 
recognize a privilege in the Virgin Islands case, the record in 
the Virgin Islands case does not disclose the content of the 
communication at issue, and reveals no evidence that the son 
sought advice from his father -- even if one may infer that the 
son's communication was otherwise confidential in nature.  
Therefore, although the dissent advocates applying the privilege 
in the Virgin Islands case, Judge Mansmann fails to identify and 





qualifications -- (1) a confidential communication, spoken or 
written, and (2) arising in the course of seeking parental 
advice27 -- would have to be determined by a hearing - a mini-
trial - which would have the effect of destroying the 
confidential nature of the communication (since the communication 
would have to be divulged so that the district court could 
determine its precise nature).  It would also endow the district 
court with virtually unlimited discretion in granting or denying 
the privilege (since the dissent provides little guidance to the 
district court for making such a determination).  The exercise of 
this discretion would undermine the very essence of a privilege 
that "the participants in the confidential conversation" can 
predict "with some degree of certainty" that their conversation 
will be protected.  See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 
(1996). 
  Thirdly, the crafting of the privilege as a jointly-
held privilege (by both parent and child) undermines the 
dissent's goal of encouraging a child to seek the advice of a 
parent and protecting the parent-child relationship.  The entire 
thrust of the dissent's opinion is that a child should feel 
confident, in communicating with a parent to seek advice and 
(..continued) 
advice from a parent -- a requirement that she identifies as 
essential for such a privilege. 
27.  As the dissent frames the privilege, if a child divulges to 
his parent that he is the Unabomber, a sex offender or an abuser 
of drugs, and does so without seeking guidance or advice, the 





guidance, that the communication will remain inviolate.  However, 
the dissent, then straddling the fence, also argues that the 
parent can choose to violate such a confidence and report a 
confidential communication to others (presumably the authorities) 
in the interest of parental judgment.  See Dissenting Opinion at 
8 n.6.  We know of no privilege that can operate in such a two-
way fashion and still remain effective. 
  The few observations made above do no more than 
highlight the stark difference between the dissent's view of the 
public good which subordinates the government's interest in 
disclosure to a parent-child privilege, and the position we have 
taken which recognizes justice and disclosure as the predominant 
principles for ascertaining truth.  See Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).   
  Finally, we observe that implicit in the various 
discussions by courts (both federal and state) of the parent-
child privilege is the fact that the "strong and trusting parent-
child relationships" which the dissent would preserve, see 
Dissenting Opinion at 2, have existed throughout the years 
without the concomitant existence of a privilege protecting that 







  In short, if a new privilege is deemed worthy of 
recognition, the wiser course in our opinion is to leave the 
adoption of such a privilege to Congress.   
 
  Although we are not reluctant to chart a new legal 
course, such an action should not be premised upon unsound legal 
principles or emotion.  The instant appeals furnish us with 
neither reason, nor analysis, nor a basis upon which to fashion 
such a privilege.   
  All that we have been told by the appellants and by the 
dissent is:  we should look to the healthy, psychological 
development of children; and that compelling the testimony of a 
parent is repugnant and indecent; that it is more important that 
a child communicate with a parent than it is to compel a parent's 
testimony; and that the preservation of the family and the 
protection of a strong and trusting parent-child relationship 
trumps all other interests.  These conclusions, as well as the 
criteria which the dissent would require as to the nature of the 
communications and whether they were imparted in an effort to 
seek advice and counseling, cannot be satisfied without the 
benefit of evidence, expert testimony, hearings or recognized 
authority.  If a new privilege were to be engraved in the 
concrete of our jurisprudence as the dissent argues, then it 
should be framed so that its contours are clear and unambiguous, 





need for multiple pretrial hearings, in addition to the 
privilege's existence being known to the participants.  Sympathy 
alone cannot justify the creation of a new and unprecedented 
privilege which does not meet the standards set by Congress, the 
Supreme Court and this court.   
  Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's order 
of June 19, 1995, which denied the father's motion to quash the 
grand jury subpoena in the Virgin Islands case (95-7354).  We 
will also affirm the district court's order of September 10, 1996 
in the Delaware cases (96-7529 and 96-7530), denying the joint 
motion to quash the grand jury subpoena and rejecting appellants' 
claims concerning the Schofield affidavit and in camera review. 
 
IN RE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS (IMPOUNDED), No. 95-7354 
In Re Grand Jury -- John Doe I, John Doe, II, Nos. 96-7530 and 
96-7259 
 
MANSMANN, J., concurring and dissenting. 
 I write separately because I am convinced that the 
testimonial privilege issue raised by the Virgin Islands appeal 
is substantially different from that presented in the Delaware 
appeals28 and should be resolved in favor of the targeted son.  
                     
28.   In the Virgin Islands appeal, a father has been 
subpoenaed to testify regarding communications made to him by his 
teenaged son.  In the Delaware appeals, on the other hand, a 
teenaged daughter has been subpoenaed to give testimony, based on 
her own knowledge, which could implicate her father in a crime; 





The Virgin Islands appeal, which challenges the denial of a 
motion to quash a grand jury subpoena, requires that we confront 
an issue of first impression in our circuit:  should we make 
available to a parent and child an evidentiary privilege which 
could be invoked to prevent compelling that parent to testify 
regarding confidential communications made to the parent by his 
child in the course of seeking parental advice and guidance?29  
It appears that this precise question is one of first impression 
in the federal courts. 
 Because I conclude that the public good at issue, the 
protection of strong and trusting parent-child relationships, 
outweighs the government's interest in disclosure, I would 
exercise the authority granted to the federal courts by Congress 
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and would 




alleged in the Delaware appeals.  As I will explain, the 
privilege question to be resolved in the Virgin Islands appeal 
focuses on the confidential communication made by a child in the 
course of seeking parental advice.  Consequently, it is more 
narrow and more compelling than that presented in the Delaware 
appeals. 
29.   The majority contends that the record in the Virgin 
Islands matter "reveals no evidence that the son sought advice 
from his father."  (Typescript at 40 n.25.)  This is incorrect.  
In the Motion to Quash filed by the son, the son refers to the 
fact that he "spoke privately with his father, seeking his 
father's counsel about the matters which are the subject of the 






 This case, unlike most which we consider, does not require 
that we apply the law as it exists with respect to testimonial 
privilege.  Instead, we are asked to determine what the law in 
this area ought to be.  While most courts have declined to 
recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege, they have done so 
in contexts far different from the one presented here.  I am 
convinced that this is an appropriate case in which to recognize 
and set parameters for a limited privilege.  Doing so is critical 
to several important public policy interests such as the 
"protection of strong and trusting parent-child relationships and 
the preservation of the sanctity of the family. . . ."  
Appellant's Brief at 8.  The recognition of a parent-child 
privilege is essential to "the healthy psychological development 
of children and to the development of society as a whole"; 
compelling a parent to testify adversely to a child is 
"`repugnant to social sensibilities' and contrary to a democratic 
view of decency."  Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child 
Privilege:  Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 583, 611-13 (1987).   
 These and other related public policy arguments have been 
advanced in a spate of articles by academicians and other legal 
commentators who, virtually uniformly, favor incorporating a 
parent-child testimonial privilege into the fabric of the law.30 
                     





 The courts, however, federal and state, have been reluctant to 
make these policy arguments the foundation for a "new" privilege. 
 In the circumstances presented here, I do not share that 
reluctance and am convinced that where compelled testimony by a 
parent concerns confidential statements made to the parent by his 
child in the course of seeking parental advice and guidance, it 




 Any inquiry concerning the federal court's extension of 
testimonial privilege necessarily begins with Rule 501 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.31  Under this Rule, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 47 
(1980), the federal courts are authorized to "develop[] . . . 
testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials governed by the 
                     
31.   Rule 501 states: 
 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the 
United States or provided by Act of Congress, or in 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, 
person, government, state, or political subdivision 
thereof shall be governed by the principle of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.  However, in civil actions and proceedings, 
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to 
which state law supplies the rule of decision, the 
privilege of witness, person, government, state or 
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in 





principles of the common law as they may be interpreted . . . in 
the light of reason and experience."  In enacting Rule 501, 
Congress specifically declined to restrict development in the law 
of privilege to the legislative realm and declined to limit the 
range of possible privileges.  Congress instead crafted Rule 501 
in order to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop 
rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."  It was Congress' 
intent "to leave the door open to change."  Id.   
 The courts' role in fostering evolution in the area of 
testimonial privilege was reinforced recently by the Supreme 
Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 1996 WL 315841 at *4 (U.S.) (footnote 
omitted): 
The Senate Report accompanying the 1974 adoption of the 
[Federal Rules of Evidence] indicates that Rule 501 
"should be understood as reflecting the view that the 
recognition of a privilege based on a confidential 
relationship should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis."  S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974).  The Rule 
thus did not freeze the law governing the privileges of 
witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in 
our history, but rather directed federal courts to 
"continue the evolutionary development of testimonial 
privileges."  Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 
(1980); see also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 
493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
 
According to the Court, "the common-law principles underlying the 
recognition of testimonial privileges can be stated simply."  Id. 
 Evidentiary privileges are "exceptions to the demand for every 
man's evidence" and should "not be lightly created nor 
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search 





(1974).  Despite the strictures of this general rule, the federal 
courts may be justified in recognizing a testimonial privilege 
where that privilege "promotes sufficiently important interests 
to outweigh the need for probative evidence."  University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel, 
445 U.S. at 51).  This is especially appropriate where, as here, 
there is no indication that Congress, in enacting Rule 501 -- or 
in any other context -- has evaluated the competing concerns 
associated with a particular privilege and has rejected that 
privilege.  See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 
189 (1990).  It is abundantly clear that under Rule 501 and the 
interpretive caselaw federal courts have authority in appropriate 
circumstances to modify the availability and scope of testimonial 







 When a federal court considers extending the scope of a 
testimonial privilege or recognizing a new privilege, Rule 501 
requires that the court engage in a balancing process, weighing 
the need for confidentiality in a particular communication 
against the need for relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. 
 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50.  I am convinced that the public good 
derived from a child's ability to communicate openly with and to 
seek guidance from his or her parents is of sufficient magnitude 
to transcend the judicial system's interest in compelled parental 
testimony.32  Recognizing that "our authority is narrow in scope 
                     
32.   In addition to the balancing test laid out in Trammel, 
Dean Wigmore has suggested a four-part test for determining 
whether or not a particular testimonial privilege should be 
recognized.  In order for a privilege to obtain:  (1) the 
communications must originate in a confidence that they will not 
be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be 
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the 
relation between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which, 
in the opinion of society, ought to be sedulously fostered; and 
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.  8 John Henry 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see also 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383-84 (3d Cir. 
1990) (weighing Dean Wigmore's four prerequisites).  I part 
company with the majority in the application of this test and am 
convinced that the factors analyzed under the Rule 501 balancing 
test are sufficient to satisfy the Wigmore test as well.  The 
first condition of the Wigmore test is satisfied in that the 
parent-child relationship is one which naturally gives rise to 
confidential communication.  Second, confidentiality underlies 
the parent child relationship; mutual trust encourages children 
to consult parents for guidance with the expectation that the 
parent will, in appropriate circumstances, honor the 
confidentiality of those statements.  Third, the family unit is 
the building block of our society and the parent-child 
relationship is at the core of that family unit.  Finally, 





and [to] be exercised only after careful consideration in the 
face of a strong showing of need for the privilege," In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990), I stress that 
the privilege which I would recognize is a limited one, applying 
only to compelled testimony concerning confidential 
communications made to a parent by his child in the course of 
seeking parental advice.  Although this case might have been more 
compelling had the son been a minor at the time of his statements 
to his father, I would not adopt a bright-line rule applicable 
only to those who have not reached legal majority.  In order to 
advance the policy interests which the targeted son articulated, 
I would prefer to leave the particular factors to be considered 
in determining application of the privilege to development on a 
case-by-case basis.  I expect that these factors would include 
such variables as age, maturity, whether or not the child resides 
with the parents, and the precise nature of the communications 
for which the privilege is claimed.  The privilege would apply to 
situations in which it is invoked by both parent and child; this 
case does not require that we confront applicability of the 
privilege where it is invoked by the parent or the child alone.   
 The goal in recognizing this limited privilege would not be 
to guarantee confidentiality per se but to shield parent-child 
relationships from the devastating effects likely to be 
(..continued) 
the damage resulting from compelling a parent to testify against 
his child, in most if not all cases, outweighs the benefit 





associated with compelled testimony.  As one commentator has 
written: 
[T]o conceive of . . . privileges merely as exclusionary 
rules, is to start out on the wrong road and, except by 
happy accident, to reach the wrong destination.  They 
are, or rather by chance of litigation may become, 
exclusionary rules; but this is incidental and 
secondary.  Primarily they are a right to be let alone, 
a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly 
prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or 
supervisory powers. . . . 
 
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusions:  
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 110-11 
(1956).  An effective parent-child relationship is one deserving 
of protection.  It rests upon a relationship of mutual trust 
where the child has the right to expect that the parent will act 
in accordance with the child's best interest.33  If the state is 
permitted to interfere in that relationship by compelling parents 
to divulge information conveyed to them in confidence by their 
children, mutual trust, and ultimately the family, are 
threatened. 
                     
33.   While it is true, as the majority says, that few 
children are likely to be aware of a privilege per se, there is, 
in any event, a certain expectation that this information will 
not be disclosed. 
 
 As the majority points out, there may be circumstances 
in which a parent, having heard communications from a child, 
decides that it is in the child's best interest that those 
communications be divulged.  The privilege which I advocate would 
not interfere with that parental judgment.  Presumably, if the 
parent is indeed acting in the child's best interest, disclosure 
will not ultimately threaten the family relationship which I seek 
to protect.  Furthermore, if the parent is willing to disclose 
information which may harm the child, the relationship is already 





 While I am aware that the availability of even this limited 
parent-child privilege may, in some rare circumstances, 
complicate a criminal fact-finding proceeding, I am convinced 
that the risk is one well worth bearing.  "[T]o reach the truth 
at the cost of the parent-child relationship would be to win the 
battle and lose the war."  Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child 
Privileges:  Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 583, 609 (1987).  This is especially true where, as here 
in the Virgin Islands case, the parent is not a co-defendant or a 
co-witness to a criminal act, and is not alleged to be hiding the 
instrumentality or the fruits of a criminal act. 
 I cannot agree with the majority that testimonial privileges 
must be regarded as automatic impediments to the effectiveness of 
the judicial system.  In limited circumstances these privileges 
are critical to important policy interests.  I am convinced, as 
was the district court, that "youngsters today are increasingly 
faced with excruciatingly dangerous and difficult situations" and 
that "the law ought to do everything possible to encourage 
children to confide in their parents and turn to [them] in times 
of trouble."  In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Misc. No. 95-009, at 
9, 10 (D.V.I. June 19, 1995). 
 
 C. 
 The spousal privilege is the only testimonial privilege 





acceptance in the federal courts.34  See In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 
16 (2d Cir. 1993).  In arguing that we should uphold the father's 
claim of privilege in this case, I am motivated by many of the 
same concerns which underlie the spousal privilege.35  The policy 
advanced by the spousal privilege "is the protection of the 
marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation 
of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to 
the administration of justice which the privilege entails."  
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).  Similar concerns 
are present here: 
                     
34.   Four relationship-based privileges have received 
federal court recognition:  those between penitent and priest, 
attorney and client, physician and patient, and, most recently, 
the privilege between therapist and patient.  See Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980), and Jaffee v. Redmond, 
1996 WL 315841 (U.S.). 
35.   Some commentators have sought to analogize the parent-
child privilege to the more widely recognized professional 
testimonial privileges such as that between attorney and client, 
priest and penitent, and physician and patient: 
 
The parent-child relationship is analogous to the privileged 
professional relationships in many respects.  As the 
professional exercises his skill in the delicate 
relationship with his client, the parent plays a unique 
and sensitive role in the life of his "client," the 
child.  In fulfilling this role, the parent must assume 
many of the same responsibilities as professionals.  
The parent, for example, often must serve as the 
child's legal advisor, spiritual counselor, and 
physical and emotional health expert.  The necessity 
for confidentiality is comparable to that within the 
professional relationships.  Like the attorney, priest, 
or psychiatrist, parents must establish an atmosphere 
of trust to facilitate free and open communication. 
 
Gregory W. Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of the 
Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege:  Too Big for its Britches?  





Ideally, the child-parent relationship encompasses aspects 
of the marital relationship -- mutual love, affection, 
and intimacy . . . the parent providing emotional 
guidance and the child relying on him for help and 
support. . . .  As in the marital . . . relation[ship], 
this optimal child-parent relationship cannot exist 
without a great deal of communication between the two. 
. . .  Manifestly, the parent's disclosure of such 
information to a third party, . . . would deter 
continued communication between child and parent. 
 
Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege:  A Proposal, 47 Fordham L. 
Rev. 771, 781 (1979).  The reasoning of the district court in In 
Re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983), is also 
instructive: 
There is no reasonable basis for extending a testimonial 
privilege for confidential communications to spouses, 
who enjoy a dissoluble legal contract, yet denying a 
parent . . . the right to claim such a privilege to 
protect communications made within an indissoluble 
family unit, bonded by blood, affection, loyalty, and 
tradition.  And further, if the rationale behind the 
privilege of a witness-spouse to refuse to testify 
adversely against his or her spouse in a criminal 
proceeding serves to prevent the invasion of the 
harmony and privacy of the marriage relationship 
itself, then affording the same protection to the 
parent-child relationship is even more compelling. 
 
 The Court in Trammel also recognized that privileges 
"affecting marriage, home and family relationships," 445 U.S. at 
48, are especially worthy of consideration.36  Within the family 
                     
36.   While the majority opinion distinguishes the privilege 
which I would recognize from those involving professional 
relationships, it does not address the parallels which exist 
between a parent-child privilege and the spousal privilege.  In 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), the Supreme Court 
held that in federal courts, the spousal privilege belongs solely 
to the spouse who is a witness.  "The court concluded that the 
justification for the privilege -- prevention of marital discord 
-- was not served by allowing the defendant spouse to prevent the 
voluntary testimony of the witness spouse . . . .  The court 





structure but beyond the marital partners, I can think of no 
relationship more fundamental than that between parent and child. 
 Society has an interest in protecting the family structure; the 
parent-child relationship is amenable to identification and 
segregation for special treatment. 
 
 D. 
 The parent-child privilege is not a novel or radical 
concept.  "Both ancient Jewish law and Roman law entirely barred 
family members from testifying against one another based on a 
desire to promote the solidarity and trust that support the 
family unit.  The Napoleonic Code also prevented the disclosure 
of confidences between family members."  J. Tyson Covey, Note, 
Making Form Follow Function:  Considerations in Creating and 
Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
879, 883.  The civil law countries of Western Europe including 
France, Sweden, and the former West Germany also recognize a 
privilege covering compelled testimony from family members.  Id. 
(..continued) 
solely to the witness. . . ."  Developments in the Law -- 
Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1568 (1985).  
The goal of protecting family relationships is paramount in the 
case now before us; the privilege which I would recognize is 
based on concerns broader than the guarantee of confidentiality. 
 As the caselaw with respect to spousal privilege establishes, a 
privilege may indeed advance these broader familial interests 
without requiring that the child be allowed to silence a parent 





 Three states (Idaho, Massachusetts and Minnesota) have 
adopted some variant of the parent-child privilege by statute,37 
and one state, New York, has judicially recognized the privilege. 
 In re A&M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 61 A.2d 426 (1978).38  Furthermore, 
                     
37.   The Idaho statute limits the privilege to 
communications by minors to their parents.  It provides in 
relevant part: 
 
Any parent, guardian or legal custodian shall not be forced 
to disclose any communication made by their minor child 
or ward to them concerning matters in any civil or 
criminal action to which such child or ward is a party. 
 Such matters so communicated shall be privileged and 
protected against disclosure . . . . 
 
Idaho Code § 9-203(7) (1990 & Supp. 1995). 
 
 In Massachusetts, a minor child is deemed incompetent 
to testify against her parent in a criminal proceeding: 
 
An unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall 
not testify before a grand jury, trial of an 
indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, 
against said parent, where the victim in such 
proceeding is not a member of said parent's family and 
who does not reside in the said parent's household. 
 
Mass. Gen. L. ch. 233, § 20 (1986 & Supp. 1996). 
 
 Minnesota also recognizes a limited parent-child 
(minor) privilege: 
 
A parent or the parent's minor child may not be examined as 
to any communication made in confidence by the minor to 
the minor's parent.  A communication is confidential if 
made out of the presence of persons not members of the 
child's immediate family living in the same household. 
 
Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1996). 
38.   The decision in this case rested on constitutional 
grounds.  See also  People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 
(Westchester County Ct. 1979) (parent-child privilege flows from 





our review of the caselaw convinces us that although a number of 
courts have declined to recognize a parent-child privilege in one 
form or another, the vast majority of those cases, indeed all of 
the federal cases, are distinguishable, on significant grounds, 
from the case before us. 
 Most cases discussing the availability of a parent-child 
privilege have done so in the context of whether a child should 
be compelled to testify against a parent.39  As the court of 
appeals acknowledged in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 
F.2d 511, 513 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), cases involving testimony by a 
child regarding activities of or communications by a parent are 
not as compelling as cases "involv[ing] confidential 
communications from the chid to the parent" because the former do 
not implicate "the desire to avoid discouraging a child from 
                     
39.   See, e.g., Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United 
States, 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 
(1988); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kaprelian v. United States, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); 
United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena of Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984); 
In re Matthews, 714 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant compelled 
to testify against in-laws); United States v. (Under Seal), 714 
F.2d 347 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 978 (1983); United 
States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); United 
States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
903 (1980); Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. App. 1981); 
State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981); Three Juveniles v. 
Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. 
Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); People v. Amos, 414 
N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332 
(Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); De Leon v. 
State, 684 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).  This is, of course, 





confiding in his parents."  A similar theme is echoed in Three 
Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Mass. 1983), 
cert. denied sub nom Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 
(1984):  "Because a parent does not need the advice of a minor 
child in the same sense that a child may need the advice of a 
parent, the case for a testimonial privilege as to confidential 
communications from parent to child seems weaker than the case as 
to such a communication from child to parent."  This distinction 
separates the Virgin Islands and Delaware appeals. 
 A second set of cases refusing to recognize a parent-child 
privilege involve children who were significantly older than the 
son in this case and did not implicate communications seeking 
parental advice and guidance.40  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has recognized, these cases, too, "present[] a 
                     
40.   See In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1993) (child is 
52); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Me. 1987) ("At the 
time of the murder [the son] was in his early twenties and was no 
longer living at the family home . . . ."); In re Gail D., 525 
A.2d 337, 337 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1987) (defendant's father is 84 
years old); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1988) (en banc). 
 
 While I recognize that the son in this case was 18 and, 
therefore, under Virgin Island law had reached the "age of 
majority" at the time of the confidential communication, 16 
V.I.C. § 261 ("All persons are deemed to have arrived at the age 
of majority at the age of 18 years, and thereafter shall have 
control of their own actions and businesses and have all the 
rights and be subject to all the liabilities of persons of full 
age."), I find it significant that the son was living at home 
when the communications were made.  I also find critical the 
district court's statement that, "It is apparent . . . that the 
confidential communications which ensued were in the nature of a 
child seeking advice from his father with whom he shared a close 
and trusting relationship.  In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Misc. 





weaker claim for recognition of a parent child privilege. . . ." 
 In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993).  
 Several cases evaluating a claim of privilege did not have 
the benefit of the balancing process embodied in Rule 501 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence41 and others did not involve 
confidential communications made by a child to a parent.42  
Finally, a number of cases rejecting the parent-child privilege 
involved defendants who sought to bar voluntary testimony offered 
                     
41.   See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(Parties "do not rely on Fed. R. Evid. 501; were this a Rule 501 
case our holding might be different since, in terms of the 
interests at stake, this case presents a compelling argument in 
favor of recognition."); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971) (decision issued four years before enactment of Fed. R. 
Evid. 501); In re Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 (power to 
recognize parent-child privilege did not belong to the court 
under express provision of state statute); Marshall v. Anderson, 
459 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("Directly unlike 
the federal courts, which under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence are granted `the flexibility to develop rules of 
privilege on a case-by-case basis . . . and to leave the door 
open to change,' the courts of Florida are statutorily forbidden 
to do so.") (citation omitted). 
42.   See Penn, 647 F.2d at 879 (defendant sought suppression 
of drug evidence after police officer offered 5-year-old child 
five dollars to show where drugs were concealed); United States 
v. Duran, 884 F. Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C. 1995) (defendant sought 
exclusion of letter written to his son under parent-chid 
privilege); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Ill. 1983) 
(defendant sought exclusion of communication with his wife in 
front of their children), rev'd on other grounds, 457 N.E.2d 1241 
(Ill. 1983); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1981) 
(defendant objected when his daughter was called as a witness on 
behalf of the state); People v. Amos, 414 N.W.2d at 148 
(privilege invoked by defendant mother to prevent son's adverse 
testimony); State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) 
(defendant sought to bar testimony by prison guard about 






by their parents.43  These cases do not present the threat to the 
family relationship posed in the case before us.  The importance 
of this distinction was summarized by the Illinois Supreme Court 
in People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ill. 1983).  The 
court in Sanders wrote that cases in which the parent-child 
privilege has been upheld have 
relied heavily upon conjecture that a family member who is 
forced to testify against her will would face the 
unpleasant choice of aiding the criminal conviction of 
a loved one, perjuring herself on the stand, or risking 
a citation for contempt of court for refusing to 
testify and the belief that the harshness of this 
choice has the effect of undermining the family 
relationship.  Such a fear is without foundation where, 
as in this case, the witness who is a family member 
volunteers her testimony.  The voluntariness of the act 
is strong evidence that the choice the witness faced 




 While there is a substantial body of authority in which 
courts have declined to recognize a parent-child privilege, none 
of the cases addresses under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence the issue of a parent's compelled testimony with respect 
to confidential advice-seeking statements made to the parent by 
                     
43.   See, e.g., In re Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914 n.1 
("The mother did not claim a `parent-child privilege.'"); Cissna 
v. State, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); In re Frances 
J., 456 A.2d 1174, 1177 (R.I. 1983) (noting that "in all of the 
cases in which the privilege has been recognized, the proponent 
of the privilege has sought to preclude the compulsion of 
testimony by a parent.  In the case before us, on the other hand, 
respondent has sought to inhibit or truncate the cross-






his teenage son .44  The facts underlying the Virgin Islands 
appeal are critical to my conclusion that we should recognize a 
                     
44.   This case is also distinguishable from the only two 
federal decisions to have recognized some form of parent-child 
privilege.  In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. 
R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982), a mother asserted 
a testimonial privilege to prevent being compelled to testify 
before a grand jury against her adult daughter.  The privilege 
asserted was based on the mother's First Amendment free exercise 
claim.  Specifically, the mother claimed that as a conservative 
Jew, she could not testify against her daughter without violating 
a basic tenet of her religion which forbids a parent to testify 
against a child.  The district court recognized a parent-child 
privilege grounded in the First Amendment, holding that 
"requiring Mrs. Greenberg to testify would interfere with her 
free exercise of religion, though only to the extent that her 
answers would incriminate her daughter."  Id. at 582.  The court 
declined to recognize a common-law privilege protecting 
confidential parent-child communications in general, however, 
noting that although compelled disclosure of non-incriminating 
confidences might damage the relationship between the mother and 
her daughter, the harm would be less severe than if an 
unemancipated minor were involved.  Id. at 586-87. 
 
 In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F. Supp. 
1298 (D. Nev. 1983), the district court considered the motion of 
a thirty-two year old son to quash a subpoena requiring him to 
testify against his father.  In granting the son's motion, the 
court recognized an expansive common-law testimonial privilege, 
holding that the government's interest in presenting all relevant 
evidence does not outweigh "an individual's right of privacy in 
his communications within the family unit, nor does it outweigh 
the family's interest in its integrity and inviolability."  Id. 
at 1325.  The court supported its decision in part by reference 
to constitutional law affording protection for the family right 
of privacy, id. at 1310, and the "expansive posture taken by 
Congress in enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 501."  Id. at 1325. 
 While I am in accord with the Agosto court with respect to the 
importance of parent-child relationships, I am not prepared to 
say that I would reach a similar result on similar facts.  The 
case presented in Agosto, involving as it did an adult child's 
testimony against a parent, is far less compelling than the case 
now before us.  Furthermore, I would decline to adopt a broad 
rule of privilege and, recognizing the need for caution and 






narrowly circumscribed parent-child privilege.  The interests 
involved in protecting the communications at issue here are far 
stronger than those involved in previous cases.  Consequently, 




 I am convinced that the public good to be derived from a 
circumscribed parent-child testimonial privilege outweighs the 
judicial system's interest in compelled parental testimony.  I 
would, therefore, recognize a privilege which could be invoked by 
a parent and child together to bar compelled testimony concerning 
confidential communications made to that parent by his child in 
the course of seeking parental advice and guidance.  I would 
reverse the district court's order in the Virgin Islands matter 







 Although I am content with the disposition of the privilege 
issue in the Delaware matters, I must comment on what is, to me, 
a disturbing aspect of these appeals. 
 Appellants in the Delaware cases attack the propriety of the 
subpoenas issued to the minor, arguing that the government failed 
to make the minimum disclosure of the grand jury's purpose 
required by our decisions in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Schofield I), 486 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), and In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir. 1975).  
These cases establish that a party seeking enforcement of a grand 
jury proceeding is required to make 
a minimum showing by affidavit . . . that each item sought 
was (1) relevant to an investigation, (2) properly 
within the grand jury's jurisdiction, and (3) not 
sought primarily for another purpose. 
 
507 F.2d at 966.  While the information supplied in the affidavit 
may be "scant," it must give "the trial judge some basis for 
determining that the three-pronged test . . . has[s] been met."  
Id. at 967. 
 It would be an overstatement to characterize the information 
contained in the affidavit submitted here as even "scant" as the 
affidavit contains nothing at all beyond a mere recitation of the 
Schofield requirements.  Our Schofield decisions, if they mean 






 My concern over erosion of the Schofield requirements is 
obviated in this case by the further proceedings conducted by the 
district court to ensure the need for the minor daughter's 
testimony.  Were it not for these further proceedings, I am 
convinced that reliance on the affidavit as it was written would 
have been error. 
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